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COMMENTS

Toward Gender Equality: Testing the
Applicability of a Broader Discrimination

Standard in the Workplace
LINDA HASSBERG*
INTRODUCTION

Twenty years after the Supreme Court first declared discrimination
solely on the basis of sex invidious,1 the overwhelming majority of women workers still toil in sex-segregated, poorly paid, dead-end jobs.2
*

J.D. candidate, SUNY at Buffalo Law School, December 1991. The author would like to

thank Professor Marjorie Girth, Mimi Lux, Kirstin Romann, and Margaret Phillips for their helpful
comments.
1. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
2. "In 1987, women represented 80% of all administrative support (including clerical) workers
. ." WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACr SHEET No. 88-2, 20 FACrS ON WOMEN
WORKERS 2 (1988). Vertical segregation also predominates in occupations that are not heavily female. For example, in the six lowest ranks of the Federal Civil Service, more than 70% of employees
are women. In contrast, women account for 10% of employees in the highest seven ranks. Francine
D. Blau & Marianne A. Ferber, Occupationsand Earningsof Women Workers, in WORKING WOMEN: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE 37, 41 (Karen S. Koziara et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter WORKING
WOMEN].
One effect of occupational segregation is the continuing depression of women's wages. Women
still earn between 60 and 65% of men's wages. One commentator notes that
[w]hile labor market factors account for some of the male-female earnings differential,
careful studies have found that less than half of the gross earnings differentials can be
accounted for by such human capital factors as education, training, experience, and skill.
The large unexplained residual is attributable to overt and institutional discrimination,
especially job segregation.
Ray Marshall & Beth Paulin, Employment and Earnings of Women: Historical Perspective, in
WORKING WOMEN, supra at 29 (citation omitted).
Occupational segregation is beginning to break down in historically male areas of employment,
most notably the professions. In 1982-1983, 36% of all law degrees, 27% of medical degrees, 17%
of dental degrees, and 12% of engineering degrees were awarded to women. Karen S. Koziara et al.,
Introduction to WORKING WOMEN, supra at vii, viii-ix. The pattern of keeping women at the bottom
of the hierarchy within the professions remains, however. See, e.g., Mario F. Bognanno, Women in
Professions" Academic Women, in WORKING WOMEN, supra at 245; Linda Liefland, CareerPatterns
of Male and Female Lawyers, 35 BUFF. L. REv. 601 (1986).
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This phenomenon has rekindled the debate among legal scholars over the
adequacy of the current legal standard mandating equal treatment for
male and female employees. Most feminist scholars agree that the current measure of discrimination, which relies on comparisons to similarly
situated parties, has been inadequate in coping with women's barriers to
employment opportunity. The disagreement lies in what changes are
necessary. Their critiques have been characterized as the special treatment/equal treatment debate.3 More recently, some scholars have attempted to move beyond the confines of this debate to create a model
that would value diversity in the workplace. 4 They argue that discarding
the use of a single norm to measure differences will help us to deal structurally with a variety of conflicts most working people face. Their efforts
at fashioning an alternative anti-discrimination standard remain largely
theoretical, however. Typically, an author will describe a model and postulate its application to a hypothetical work setting with little discussion
of implementation.
Building on the theoretical models offered by this group of scholars,
this article fashions a new anti-discrimination standard which would promote equality for women in the workplace by reducing gender stereotyping and encouraging acceptance of the diverse needs and strengths
workers bring to their jobs. It then attempts to test the applicability of
such a standard in evaluating employment policies. Parts I and II provide an overview of the current sex discrimination standard and a review
of the equal treatment/special treatment debate. In Part III, the efforts
to build a new legal standard are examined. Finally, an attempt is made
in Part IV to apply such a standard to evaluate work regulations and
employee benefits Yhich concern the intersection of work and family responsibilities - leave, dependent care, and flexible work scheduling.
I.

THE CURRENT SEX DISCRIMINATION STANDARD

Discrimination on the basis of sex has been constitutionally prohibited for most situations' since 1971.6 The Supreme Court in Reed v.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part III.
5. Wendy Williams, a feminist legal critic, argues that the Supreme Court has barred gender
discrimination only in "easy" cases. See Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections
on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175 (1982) [hereinafter Williams,
Equality Crisis].These cases all struck down laws with "sex-based classifications... premised on the
old breadwinner-homemaker, master-dependent dichotomy inherent in [a] separate spheres ideology." Id. at 178-79. Williams contends that in the "hard" cases which dealt with sex-role arrangements outside an outdated economic model of the family, discriminatory laws were upheld by the
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Reed 7 held that a state could not arbitrarily favor men over women when
the two sexes were otherwise similarly situated. This perception of discrimination was patterned closely on previous rulings banning racial and
other types of discrimination considered invidious by the courts.8 It was
predicated on the idea that differential treatment between classes is based
more on historically and/or culturally stereotyped views of people than
actual differences. Using the standard of "similarly situated," these
classes of people are compared to the norm, and must be treated similarly. It has been successfully argued in the courts that much of the differential treatment afforded women is also based on stereotypical views
that obscure the similarities between groups. 9
The Supreme Court eventually fashioned an intermediate or "middle-tier" scrutiny standard to determine the constitutionality of discrimination based on gender.10 Unlike the strict scrutiny given to any statute
employing prima facie racial discrimination, the standard for analyzing a
statute which discriminates on the basis of sex allows for some legitimate
differential treatment of men and women. The Court has typically 'upheld differential treatment in situations where the genders are perceived
as immutably different based on mixture of deeply-held cultural norms
and biological dissimilarities. 1
Court. For her classification of specific Supreme Court gender discrimination cases into "easy" and
"hard" categories, see id. at 179-80.
6. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
7. 404 U.S. 71.
8. In Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920), the Supreme Court first interpreted
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as permitting state legislatures to treat
various classes of people differently as long as the classification was "reasonable, not arbitrary, and
... rest[ed] upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." 253 U.S. at 425, quoted
in Reed, 404 U.S. at 76 (1971). The Reed Court applied this standard in striking down an Idaho
statute which mandated that males be favored over females to administer an estate. "Regardless of
their sex, persons within any one of the enumerated classes ... are similarly situated with respect to
th[e] objective [of the statute]. By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus
similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause." 404 U.S. at 77. This
language subsequently became the similarly-situated standard. See also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
9. See, eg., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero,411 U.S. 677.
10. The "middle-tier" approach was first officially acknowledged in an unnumbered footnote to
Justice Powell's concurrence in Craig, 429 U.S. at 210-211.
11. The most obvious example of this mixture is Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), in
which the Court upheld the exemption of women from registration for the military draft. Although
Justice Rehnquist's opinion rests in large part on the need for extreme deference to congressional
decisions on military matters, he seems to accept without question Congress' conclusion that women
are simply not suited for combat, either because of their biological make-up, because of the make-up
of the men with whom they would have to fight, or merely because of a perceived national consensus.
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The Court's acceptance of the existence of immutable differences
permits the argument that under certain circumstances women can never
be similarly situated to men. Since the Court's current analysis considers
differential treatment unconstitutionally discriminatory only when a
plaintiff meets the similarly-situated standard, a finding of immutable difference would relieve a defendant from treating a woman on an equal
basis. Therefore, the conceptualization of the differences becomes crucial
to the determination of relationship between the norm and the discriminated-against class.
The Court's treatment of pregnancy discrimination illustrates the
dilemma of determining what is or should be equal treatment in the face
of seemingly immutable differences. In the immediate post-Reed years,
the Court found that discrimination against pregnant women fell outside
the narrow definition of constitutionally prohibited sex-based discrimination, precisely because of the "similarly situated" standard. The first
case, Geduldig v. Aiello, 2 brought under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, challenged a California policy which excluded the risks of disability resulting from normal pregnancy under its
disability insurance system while covering every other disability. The
Court concluded that the covered and non-covered classes were not divided along gender lines. Instead, they contained one class of men and
non-pregnant women and a second group made up of pregnant women.
Women as a class were not subject to discrimination so no per se sex
discrimination occurred.
The second case, GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert," based on a similar
set of facts, was brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. One
feminist legal critic explained that Justice Rehnquist's opinion in General
Electric took the Geduldig analysis one step further:
Under Title VII, rules that are "neutral" but have a disproportionate sexbased effect may also violate the Act. However, the particular "neutral"
GeneralElectricpregnancy disability rule, said Justice Rehnquist, could not
even be viewed as having a discriminatory effect on women. Men and women, he said, are both covered by the disability program. Moreover, they
are covered for the disabilities common to both sexes. Pregnancy disabilities are therefore an "additionalrisk, unique to women." Failure to comThe report of the Senate Armed Services Committee, S. Rep. No. 826, quoted extensively in the

Rostker majority opinion, specifically mentions that the exclusion of women from combat "enjoys
wide support among our people." 453 U.S. at 77 (quoting S. REP. No. 826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 157
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2641, 2647).
12. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
13. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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pensate women
for them does not upset the basic sex equality of the
14

program.

In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA),15 an amendment to Title VII, as an explicit response to the
Supreme Court's decisions regarding pregnancy discrimination.16 The
PDA amended the definition section of Title VII to provide that
the terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related

medical conditions.... Women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs,

as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work....17

The subsequent Supreme Court cases which interpreted the PDA
clearly jettisoned the Geduldig/Gilbertapproach. In Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,1 an employer's insurance policy that
provided greater pregnancy-related health coverage to female employees
than to wives of male workers, was struck down relying on the language
of the PDA. Four years later in California Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n. v. Guerra,19 the Court upheld a California state statute mandating
that employers allow up to four months maternity leave for pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical condition. The statute20 entitled eligible
employees to the use of accrued sick and vacation time and to reinstatement to the same or equivalent job without loss of benefits. The defendant argued that the law violated the letter of the PDA in requiring
14. Wendy W. Williams, Equality'sRiddle Pregnancyandthe Equal Treatment/SpecialTreatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. &,Soc. CHANGE 325, 345 (1984-1985) (quoting General Elec. Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 139) [hereinafter Williams, Equality'sRiddle]. Williams continued her analysis as follows:
In a footnote, [Justice Rehnquist] drove home the point: Title VII does not require "that
'greater economic benefit[s]' ... be paid to one sex or the other because of their differing
roles in the 'scheme of human existence."' This conclusion makes breathtakingly explicit the underlying philosophy of the majority of the justices in Geduldig and Gilbert.
Pregnancy, for Rehnquist, is an "extra," an add-on to the basic male model for humanity. Equality does not contemplate handing out benefits for extras - indeed, to do so
would be to grant special benefits to women, possibly discriminating against men.
Id at 345-46 (quoting Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 139 n.17).
15. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
16. H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749,
4750-51.
17. Id.
18. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
19. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
20.

CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980).
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different protection for pregnant women than was afforded other workers. The Court declared that the PDA should be read as "a floor beneath
which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop - not a ceiling above
which they may not rise."21 Finally, Wimberly v. Labor & Industrial
Relations Commission2 2 qualified the Court's position in Guerra by ruling that, while the PDA permitted statutory preferential treatment of
pregnant women, it did not mandate such treatment.2 3
These decisions demonstrate the difficulties faced by the Supreme
Court in adjudicating employer treatment of pregnant women under the
current discrimination analysis. The Court has trouble maintaining a
balance between the recognition of a formal equality, which must ignore
the effects of difference, and an acknowledgement that some differences
cannot be fit into the framework of "similarly situated." As set forth
below, legal scholars have grappled with this dilemma in their attacks on
the continuation of gender discrimination.
II.

SPECIAL TREATMENT, EQUAL TREATMENT, AND ALTERNATIVES

The acceptability of differential treatment is hotly debated within
the feminist legal community. The great majority of feminist scholars
share the desire to ameliorate women's position in society by minimizing
or eliminating the negative images and consequences associated with
those societal roles traditionally labeled "female." 24 Nonetheless, the
disagreements over methodology and scope have caused significant theoretical and strategical splits. The major area of dispute, which is discussed below, places legal scholars into two somewhat contradictory
camps called special treatment and equal treatment. Advocates of equal
treatment demand that women be treated no differently than men, regardless of status.2 5 Application of their standard would prohibit discrimination against women for any reason. For example, the equal
21.

479 U.S. at 285 (quoting circuit court's opinion at 758 F.2d 390, 396).

22.
23.

479 U.S. 511 (1987).
Id. at 517-18. The Supreme Court recently issued another decision reaffirming PDA's equal

treatment mandate for pregnant women and extending that mandate to potentially pregnant women
as well. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (199 1), rev'g and remanding 886 F.2d.

871 (7th Cir. 1989). For a brief explanation of this case, see infra note 53.
24. Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1290-91
(1987); Williams, Equality'sRiddle, supra note 14, at 329-31.
25. The litigators of the pathbreaking constitutional sex discrimination cases of the early 1970's
championed this approach. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). One observer noted that this approach led to
"the rather counterintuitive use of male plaintiffs in most of the major constitutional sex discrimination cases" which reached the Supreme Court. Littleton, supra note 24, at 1291 n.75.
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treatment approach would mandate that a woman be granted leave time
from work and disability benefits for pregnancy, childbirth, and recovery
on the same basis as a man with a legitimate medical excuse for absence.
Wendy Williams, one of the foremost equal treatment advocates,
justifies her legal approach with an historical analysis.2 6 She points out
that whenever women have been treated differently or "specially" in law,
even with the best intentions, the outcome has been discriminatory.2 7
Employers, judges, and administrators have emphasized the differences
between men and women and have relied on that emphasis to reinforce
stereotypes and to limit our opportunities "for our own good."28 The
passage of protective labor legislation in the early twentieth century, for
example, was an attempt to protect the health of women workers by setting a maximum number of hours that employers could require them to
work.2 9 The rationale underpinning this legislation was that women's
physical weaknesses and domestic responsibilities placed them in need of
special protection. This same rationale permitted employers to restrict
certain jobs and occupations to men.30
A corollary argument is that labeling certain concerns as "women's
issues" denigrates the importance of these concerns precisely because of
their label. Equal treatment proponents fear that issues such as the conflict between parental responsibilities and work life will not be adequately
addressed by either employers or employees as long as they are viewed as
women's problems. As one commentator states:
Accommodation to parental needs and obligations should penetrate to the
core of the workplace rather than remain a peripheral "women's issue."
Treating parenthood as a non-issue structurally marginalizes women as
workforce participants. Women's increasingly pervasive workforce attachment means that pregnancy should no longer be treated as a private problem of marginal workers best handled by the old exclusionary method.3 1
In short, advocates believe that an equal treatment standard is necessary to force both employers and employees to confront issues that
have been traditionally viewed as women's problems. Only equal treat26. See Williams, The Equality Crisis,supra note 5.
27. See id. at 179-90.
28. See, eg., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding legislation limiting the length of

the workday for women on the basis of their special maternal functions).
29. ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING

WOMEN IN

186-88 (1982).
30. Id. at 185. For an excellent analysis of the impact of protective labor legislation on women
workers, see id at 180-214.
31. Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 14, at 353-54.
THE UNITED STATES
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ment can encourage the perception that the conflicts of work and family
responsibilities are conflicts the whole society must face.
Special treatment proponents, on the other hand, argue that it is
precisely in those areas of biological difference such as pregnancy that
the equal treatment approach disadvantages women. In circumstances
where a similarly-situated male does not exist, merely treating women
equally in a formal sense usually ignores real biological and cultural differences. Because of past discrimination, even in formally gender neutral
situations, women will face greater obstacles to success than men. 2
Some feminist legal scholars favor the special treatment approach
for strategic reasons. They argue that the "uniqueness" analysis is more
understandable than the strained analogy of "similarly situated" for
equal treatment, particularly as it pertains to biological differences:
It is likely that to both the Supreme Court and the American public the
distinctions between the condition of pregnancy... and any medical condition faced by a man would leap out with much greater force and vigor than
the similarities. The liberal [equal treatment] model... fails to focus on the
effect of the very real sex difference of pregnancy on the relative positions of
men and women in society and on the goal of assuring equality
33 of opportunity and effect within a heterogeneous "society of equals."
Special treatment advocates assert that real biological and cultural differences between women and men must be taken into account in order to
achieve actual equality. To this end, employers and the state must be
allowed, or even required, to compensate for the unique situations that
women face.
Feminist legal scholar Christine Littleton noted in a recent article
that a spectrum of opinion exists on each side of this debate. 34 Equal
treatment advocates, or symmetrists as Littleton prefers to call them,
subdivide into assimilationists and androgynists. 35 Whereas assimilationists would be content to keep the current standard as the norm and require social institutions to treat women as they already treat men,
androgynists argue for some golden mean between men and women by
which to measure treatment of both sexes.36
32. For an exposition of this viewpoint, see Sylvia A. Law, RethinkingSex and the Constitution,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984).
33. Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment,
Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. RV.513, 541-542

(1983) (citation omitted).
34. Littleton, supra note 24.
35. Id. at 1291-92.
36. Id. at 1292.
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Littleton furthers identifies four distinct models of asymmetry, one
of which is her own. 37 The "bivalent" model forthrightly claims special
rights for women based on special needs, discarding prima facie equality
for justice. 38 The "accommodation" model, for which Sylvia Law and
Henna Hill Kay are key proponents, 39 distinguishes between biological
and cultural differences, sanctioning special treatment for the former, but
mandating that culturally-based differences between men and women be
approached on an equal treatment principle. Under this model, the government "need only insist that women be given what they need to resemble men, such as time off to have babies and the freedom to return to
work on the same rung of the ladder as their male counterparts."'
Littleton's own model, which she labels "the equality of acceptance," focuses on the ways in which differences are permitted to justify
inequality and then seeks to eliminate the unequal consequences of different treatment. Using the example cited above concerning women who
choose to return to work after spending time at home caring for an infant, she explains:
[This model] might additionally insist that women and men who opt for
socially female occupations, such as child-rearing, be compensated at a rate
similar to those women and men who opt for socially male occupations,
such as legal practice. Alternatively, such occupations might be restructured to make them especially accessible
to those whose behavior is cultur41
ally coded "male" or "female.",
Finally, feminist scholar Catherine MacKinnon approaches the
achievement of equality between the sexes as one which rejects difference
as a relevant subject of inquiry and focuses directly on subordination and
domination. Under MacKinnon's analysis, "[i]f a law, practice, or policy
contributes to the subordination of women or their domination by men,
it violates equality. If it empowers women or contributes to the breakdown of male domination, it enhances equality."' 2
The range of views encompassed in these two approaches parallel
each other. Scholars at one end accept the existing structures and attempt to find accommodations to alleviate the negative effects of gender
discrimination. A more radical methodology would modify the struc37. Id. at 1291-1304.
38. Id. at 1295.
39. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference" The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985); Law, supra note 32.

40. Littleton, supra note 24, at 1301.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1299-1300.
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tures to include women's perspectives and experiences. At the extreme
ends, the basic foundation of societal structures and values which differentiate and rank hierarchically male and female attributes are attacked.
Still other feminist legal theorists have criticized the whole special
treatment/equal treatment debate for being too limited to address all of
the underlying problems of perpetuating gender roles in the workplace
and the larger society.4' They argue that the confines of the debate impede the development of a new theoretical model. One theorist, Lucinda
Finley, expressed her difficulties as follows:
Equality analysis currently approaches the problem of differences either by
pretending they do not exist, or by stigmatizing those who are different ....
Present equality analysis asks which differences count and which do
not; or, what are the relevant similarities and differences? This approach
diverts attention from the need to ask how acknowledged difference should
count and how the law should respond to the variety of differences between
people. 44
Finley acknowledges that modifications of this analysis within the
existing framework of rights may help traditionally powerless people to
gain access to the privileges of the powerful. 45 In tackling the more fundamental questions of the meaning and value of individual rights, privileges, and responsibilities in our society, however, the equality principle
becomes too confining.
The effort to fit all our approaches to gender problems into the current
framework of equality may obscure the deeper context of the issues....
Although it is possible to infuse the word "equality" with a conception that
is more sensitive to the bias embedded in structures and values than the
comparative approach, at present it may be easier to make advances towards the goal of meaningful change in social structures and attitudes if we
try not to think about
problems such as accommodating pregnancy as
"equality" problems. 46
Finley asserts that our society's conception of separate public and
private spheres hinders attempts at integrating the demands of work and
home life and perpetuates false assumptions of differences between men
and women.4 7 She blames this public-private dichotomy for the accept43. See, eg., Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity
and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1986).
44. Id. at 1167-68.
45. Id. at 1164.
46. Id. at 1163-64.
47. Id. at 1165.
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ance of a "definition of career commitment that allows work demands to
crowd out other needs and the related assumptions that the career commitments of women are reduced by their family responsibilities.""a
In order to challenge these assumptions and eventually replace them
with a value system more sympathetic to women and others who remain
outside the privileged sphere, Finley suggests a new form of rights analysis.4 9 Her analysis suggests evaluating individual rights not only from
the point of view of freedom of choice and privacy but also responsibility
and interdependency. Finley states:
[T]he word "rights" too often connotes fending off, retreating into a protected private zone. While individual protections from interference by
others and the state are important for maintaining a democratic society, the
need for freedom from interference with autonomy hardly describes the full
range of human needs. The values of community and interconnection are
deserving of recognition by the legal system. Accordingly, the notion of
rights should be supplemented by conceptions of responsibility, ... [which]
means not simply honoring obligations, but respond[ing] to the perspectives
and needs of others.50
As an example of considering the rights of others, Finley posits a workplace where the employer must take into account the ability of his or her
employees to integrate their home and work lives in determining job definition and workplace scheduling.
Another feminist scholar, Nancy Dowd, also criticizes the bifurcated view of discrimination analysis with respect to conflicts between
work and family responsibilities in employment.5 1 She states that the
problem is usually not one of breaking down barriers, as the equality
model has enabled some impressive achievements in that regard. Rather,
she asserts that it is the inadequaciesof the workplace structure that need
addressing.5 2 When work/family conflicts in employment have been
characterized as gender and/or women's issues, the solutions have
tended to reinforce the divisions between gender roles. Maternity leaves
are granted because women have babies, rather than granting child care
leave for a parent to care for a newborn. 3 On the other hand, when the
48. Id. at 1166.
49. Id. at 1167-70.
50. Id. at 1171.
51. Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The GenderParadox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuringthe Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79 (1987).
52. Id. at 139.
53. The current treatment of so-called fetal rights by certain employers further illustrates this
approach. In the interest of the protection of fetuses, and even potential fetuses, employers have
instituted policies restricting women of childbearing age from jobs which might expose them to
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problem is viewed gender-neutrally, the solutions usually fail to deal with
the real, even if socially-constructed, differences that women and men
encounter when attempting to balance work with raising a family. Qualifications for promotion might include participation in extracurricular activities that women with families cannot attend.
Dowd sees a resolution of this impasse in the construction of an
analysis promoting diversity and pluralism, somewhat like that used to
ascertain discrimination against handicapped people.5 4 Her analysis encourages us to view people as having a great variety of needs as well as
abilities and strives to accommodate as wide a spectrum as possible,
rather than adhering to a norm. Dowd argues that use of this form of
discrimination analysis would be more successful than equality analysis
in preventing the perpetuation of gender roles at the workplace and in
the community.55
The distinctions delineated within the debate between formulating a
new legal standard of equality that will encompass women's experiences
and needs as well as their labor into the workplace versus replacing the
equality standard with one less weighed down by precedential limits are
theoretically and strategically important. In shaping the direction of
change, the implications of existing models and possible replacements in
overly high levels of toxic materials. In UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991),
rev'g and remanding 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), the Supreme Court has just ruled that denying
"potentially pregnant" women access to jobs in worksites with high lead exposure levels violates the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act. The employer policy at issue in Johnson Controls was drawn so
broadly that the court agreed unanimously to strike it down as discriminatory. However, the tenor
of the concurring opinions by Justices White and Scalia suggests that fetal protection policies will
continue to surface.
The controversies surrounding these policies lie outside the scope of this article, but can certainly
be scrutinized with the same prism of perpetuation of gender roles as other responses to potential
conflicts of work and family responsibilities. For further discussion, see Ellen Bigge, Comment, The
Fetal Rights Controversy: A Resurfacing of Sex Discriminationin the Guise of Fetal Protection, 57
UMKC L. REv. 261, 273-77 (1989); Emily Buss, GettingBeyond Discrimination: 4 RegulatorySolution to the Problem of FetalHazards in the Workplace, 95 YALE LJ. 577 (1986); Hannah Arterian
Furnish, PrenatalExposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments: The Dilemma of the 1978 Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of.1964, 66 IOWA L. REv. 63 (1980); Wendy
W. Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection With
Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641 (1981).
54. Dowd, supra note 51, at 162-63. Laws protecting handicapped people against discrimination emphasize the right of individuals to achieve their potential rather than meeting an arbitrary
norm. For example, the federal Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (1989),
provides for a free, appropriatepublic education for handicapped children and establishes the use of
Individual Education Plans to insure the education meets the child's needs. The child does not get
the same or equivalent educational programs as other children because the law recognizes that each
child has unique strengths and weaknesses.
55. Dowd, supra note 51, at 164-68.
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the legal arena need careful consideration. Precise definitions are crucial
to winning new legislation and litigating favorable case law.
Nevertheless, the similarities of purpose and aim among these feminist legal scholars is striking. All are concerned that women remain stigmatized and victimized by our real and perceived differences from men.
They all seek to shape a legal formula that will not only eliminate the
inequalities, but also force the society to reexamine, on some level, the
ordering of priorities and values that have put those which are traditionally male above those which are traditionally female. The main differences seem to lie in the methodology proposed to achieve particular ends,
such as equal opportunity in the workplace and in the analysis of the
long-term ideological and legal consequences of a given method or legal
standard.
Given the similarities among the various new standards offered by
feminist legal scholars, it does not seem too difficult to formulate a provisional "feminist" discrimination standard which could be tested in the
environment these scholars seek to change - the workplace. The
shortfalls of existing gender discrimination analysis have been amply
demonstrated. The critiques offer guidelines for what an improved standard should accomplish. Before further theoretical refinement can be
fruitful, testing should occur to determine the strengths and weaknesses
of any modifications to the existing gender discrimination standard and
the pitfalls involved in their application. To this end, the next Part of
this article will fashion such a provisional standard.
III.

ESTABLISHING A NEW STANDARD

The theoretical debates over equality analysis and its impact on women have not grown in a vacuum. The lives of women have changed
rapidly and radically in the last twenty-five to thirty years. A typical
woman in the United States today spends a much smaller proportion of
her life devoted to caring for children and the home than her mother did
and much more time in paid, permanent employment.5 6 For example,
24% of women with infants one year or inder were employed outside the
home in 1970.17 That percentage jumped to 39% in 1980 and topped
56. The dramatic rise in labor force participation rates of women in the United States has been
well documented. For a general exposition of the statistics and reasons for these changes, see Marshall & Paulin, supra note 2, at 19-23.
57. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., PREGNANCY AND EMPLOYMENT: THE COMPLETE
HANDBOOK ON DISCRIMINATION, MATERNITY LEAVE, AND HEALTH AND SAFETY 107, 108 (1987)

[hereinafter BNA HANDBOOK].
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50% by 1987.8 Sixty percent of all women having babies now work
during pregnancy, and a 1982 survey found that nearly half of pregnant
women employed in white collar and managerial positions worked during their ninth month. 9
These numbers indicate a profound shift in the status and daily lives
of an entire segment of our population. Less than one generation ago this
group of women was performing one full-time job - household and
child care. The increased prevalence of outside employment coupled
with an equally dramatic rise in the percentage of single mothers means
that most women are now working at least two jobs.
Women enter and remain in the workforce primarily for economic
reasons, but they are also motivated by the rewards and opportunities
outside employment has to offer. Unfortunately, these opportunities
come at a very high cost to women, their families, and in the long run,
society as a whole.' Too often women are caught between a work life
that does not allow for any integration of family responsibilities and a
home and community life that still demands women's primary allegiance.
Legislatures and courts react slowly and imperfectly to problems
created by this type of societal change. One author explained the limited
effect of bringing suit to change a hostile work environment:
Litigation can also be a comparatively blunt tool for producing changes in
workplace norms. Judgements - and even opinions - in sexual harassment cases give employers only an anecdotal notion of what behavior is
unacceptable, and otherwise fail to direct employers toward more satisfactory behavior. Nor do these decisions, in and of themselves, organize or
educate employees to produce the necessary changes in conduct. An adverse judgement also may put supervisors on the defensive, rather than engaging them as participants in bringing about change. For the protection of
women and the education of those who victimize6 1them, it is necessary to
explore less coercive means of normative change.
Despite recent legislation such as the Pregnancy Discrimination
58. Id.; Sheila B. Kamerman, ParentalLeave and Infant Care: U.S. and InternationalTrends
and Issues, 1978-1988, in PARENTAL LEAVE AND CHILD CARE: SETTING A RESEARCH AND POLICY AGENDA 11, 12 (Janet Hyde & Marilyn Essex eds., 1991) [hereinafter PARENTAL LEAVE AND
CHILD CARE].

59. BNA HANDBOOK, supra note 57, at 108.
60. A recent study calculated that American working women who have babies suffer an annual
loss of more than $31 billion in gross earnings. Roberta M. Spalter-Roth & Heidi 1. Hartmann,
Science and Politicsand the "Dual Vision" ofFeministPolicy Research: The Example ofFamily and
Medical Leave, in PARENTAL LEAVE AND CHILD CARE, supra note 58, at 41, 50.
61. Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discriminationand the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1216 (1989).
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Act,6 2 current laws have had little impact in combatting the feminization
of poverty.6 3 The cumbersome, compromising nature of the legislative
process impedes effective response to problems that are a result of the
breakdown of community support and widespread discrimination in employment. Enactment of even the most assimilationist or accommodationist prescriptions of legal protection of women workers elaborated by
the feminist theoreticians seems far from fruition."
If courts and legislatures have been unable thus far to fashion remedies to address the needs of women, how will the proposed new standards
be implemented? The largely abstract literature in this field concerns itself very little with methods of introducing a new view of gender roles
and equality. When the discussion does touch on applicability, one finds
an almost uniform emphasis on amending legislative and common law to
force changes in behavior and thinking despite the inadequacy of such a
response to date. 65 The narrowness of this range of suggested solutions is
somewhat surprising given that the workplace provides, or can provide,
an ideal laboratory during this transitional period for the changes sought
by theorists. Several legal scholars have focused explicitly on the work
setting to illustrate the implications of a truer equality between genders.6 6
They posit a new standard of employer behavior and attempt to paint a
picture of the altered employment setting which would result, but they
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
63. The term "feminization of poverty" refers to the increasing concentration of women as a
percentage of those who live in poverty in the United States.
64. For example, as of July, 1991 only eight states have passed legislation requiring any private
employers to provide unpaid parental or family leave with reinstatement. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 144, at D-1 (July 26, 1991). For an analysis of these laws, see Susan D. Ross, Legal Aspects of
ParentalLeave: At the Cross Roads, in PARENTAL LEAVE AND CHILD CARE, supra note 58, at 93.
But see John R. Plewa, The Wisconsin Family and Medical Leaves Act: StatesResolving the Conflict
Between Parenthoodand Livelihood, in PARENTAL LEAVE AND CHILD CARE, supra note 58, at 187,
for an argument for enacting such legislation on the state level.
65. For a discussion of the inadequacies of the parental leave policies of large firms, see generally Randy Sheinberg, ParentalLeave Policies of Large Firms, in THE PARENTAL LEAVE CRISIS:
TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY? (Edward F. Zigler & Meryl Frank eds., 1988) [hereinafter PARENTAL LEAVE CRISIS]; Marjorie Jacobson, Note, Pregnancy and Employment: Three Approaches to
Equal Opportunity, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1019 (1988). A recently published book of essays, PARENTAL
LEAVE AND CHILD CARE, supranote 58, reaches beyond these options with an exploration of policy
analysis and implementation.
66. Finley, supra note 43, Littleton, supra note 24, Dowd, supra note 51, and Abrams, supra
note 61, all give examples of what such an altered work environment might look like. Abrams offers
the most specific portrait of the possible effects of eliminating sexual harassment and encouraging
parental leave policies. She also discusses the limitation of focusing on change through legislation
and the courts, and finds voluntary compliance programs as a more effective alternative. However,
she stops short of suggesting methods for introducing and enforcing such programs. See Abrams,
supra note 61, at 1216-20, 1226-48.
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barely touch upon the methods for applying a new standard.67
Both employers and their employees are struggling to keep up with
the demographic transformation of the workforce and the concomitant
challenges it brings. Where the employer is unresponsive to workers'
needs, either because the stability of the workforce is not important, or
because the workers have no voice, legally mandated changes are perhaps
the only avenue for improvement.6" However, in those workplaces and
industries where a response is necessary and/or desirable, employers and
their employees are developing a whole array of experiments to cope with
shifting demands and needs.
In work settings where women are unionized or otherwise are in a
position to pressure their employers, responses to the needs of the changing workforce are the most evident and amenable to evaluation. 69 In
unionized industries, collective bargaining agreements reflect the needs of
workers as well as employers. The collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) is produced through a series of negotiations between the employer
and its employees, and constitutes a more consensual approach to determining conditions of employment than the unilateral imposition
of rules
found in most non-union environments. The set of rules resulting from
collective bargaining, it can be argued, is more likely to reflect the needs
and wishes of the workers than those imposed unilaterally by the employer,1° even acknowledging that an employer who desires to retain a
stable, loyal workforce will attempt to cater to its workers' needs when
possible.
Contracts resulting from a collective bargaining process, therefore,
provide an interesting source of workplace regulations designed to deal
67. It could be argued that scholars in other disciplines with more direct access to the workplace and its actors should address the application of these abstract ideas to the work setting. The
inability of legal scholars to explore the implications of their models in more concrete form, however, has often meant that others tackling the problem have not incorporated new interpretations of
what equality between the sexes should look like. See, eg., Felice N. Schwartz, Management Women and the New Facts of Life, HARv. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 65.
68. A recent study of the impact of state parental leave laws in Oregon, Minnesota, Rhode
Island, and Wisconsin found that only one in seven employers met the standards of the statutes prior
to their enactment. See Pens. & Ben. Daily (BNA) (May 28, 1991).
69. See, eg., Eileen Trzcinski, Employers' ParentalLeave Policies Does the LaborMarket Provide ParentalLeave?, in PARENTAL LEAVE AND CHILD CARE, supra note 58, at 209, 220; Carolyn
York, The Labor Movement's Role in ParentalLeave and Child Care, in PARENTAL LEAVE AND
CHILD CARE, supra note 58, at 176.

70. Julius G. Getman, The Changing Role of Courts and the PotentialRole of Unions in Overcoming Employment Discrimination, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1477, 1482 (1990). Getman proposes that
civil rights organizations work more closely with unions in collective bargaining settings to further
the interests of women and minority workers. See also York, supra note 69, at 176.
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with the conflicts between work and family responsibilities. Clauses addressing the conflicts between work and home responsibilities are proliferating in union contracts 7 ' as the workforce as a whole becomes more
heavily female,7 2 and even more importantly, as women increase as a
percentage of union membership and leadership."
Employer-offered plans in non-unionized settings in which women
are becoming increasingly important 74 provide a second source of workrules that can be evaluated for their impact on gender roles at work and
in the community. These employers see the need to adapt leave and
other policies which consider home and family responsibilities in order to
attract and keep both qualified women and perhaps even men who have
become more concerned and involved with home care duties." Indeed,
some employers are finding that improving family-related benefits can be
an effective substitute for salary increases.76

The remainder of this article will attempt to test the applicability of
71. Work and Family Benefits, Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) No. 1150, at
16:721 (June 29, 1989) [hereinafter BNA Study]; York, supra note 69.
72. In 1968, women comprised 37% of the workforce. Twenty years later the percentage had
increased to 45%. Ruth Needleman, Women Workers: A Forcefor Rebuilding Unionism, 11 LAB.

REs. REv. 2 (1988).
73. Ruth Milkman, a sociologist analyzing the involvement of women in unions, reported an
increase in union membership of women workers from 18.6 percent in 1956 to 24.2 percent in 1978.
When membership in employee associations is included in this figure, the proportion of organized
women in the work force rises to 30% by 1980. Women represented 55% of national officers and
board members in the association with the largest number of organized women, the National Education Association. The ten unions with the largest female membership reported participation rates of
women on their national boards ranging from 0 to 25%. Ruth Milkman, Women Workers, Feminism and the Labor Movement Since the 1960's, in WOMEN, WORK AND PROTEST: A CENTURY OF
U.S. WOMEN'S LABOR HISTORY 304-306 (Ruth Milkman ed., 1985).
Even when women represent only a small percentage of the organized workforce, they can make
an impact in focusing attention on particular issues. For a discussion of the efforts of one such
minority group, see Cosby Totten et al., Women Miners' Fight for ParentalLeave, 11 LAB. RES.
Rnv. 89 (1988).
74. The influx of permanent women workers is most striking in professional work such as law,
medicine, accounting, and management. Marshall & Paulin, supra note 2, at 23. The legal profession is a good example of a startling growth pattern. In 1970, women comprised merely 8.5% of all
law students. By 1988, women comprised over 40% of the law school population. Eleanor M. Fox,
Being a Woman, Being a Lawyer and Being a Human Being: Woman and Change, 57 FORDHAM L.
REVIEW 955, 957-58 (1989).
75. For example, a recent, informal survey of public law offices found widespread availability of
maternity and paternity leave and part-time work schedules for attorneys. See Margaret G. King,
Gender Equality in the Public Sector, 57 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 985, 986 (1989).
76. A newly released study found that while state governments can seldom match the salaries
produced by private competitors, they can offer benefits which will attract and retain good quality
workers. Some pioneering efforts have resulted. See Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (Sept. 2, 1991)
(summarizing the findings of FAMILIES & WORK INST., STATE REFERENCE GUIDE TO WORK-FAMILY PROGRAM (1991)); see also infra Part IV.
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a new standard of discrimination in evaluating contract language and
* employment policies taken from a variety of work settings. Although
there is no definition of equality analysis with which even the majority of
feminist legal theoreticians seem to agree, Lucinda Finley identifies two
features which any satisfactory standard must include. The first is a
challenge of the assumptions inherent in a single normative standard for
all workers:
[W]e must constantly subject to critical scrutiny the idea of a normal standard of measurement, defined by those with the power to define. We must
scrutinize structures such as job requirements and expectations, and assumptions about human capabilities, to see to what extent they are determined not by the real needs of the job or of society, but by the idea of a
norm that does not actually reflect job functions or the composition of society or the workforce. 7
Secondly, Finley asserts, the balance between individual rights and responsibilities must also be scrutinized:
[I]n the workplace the concept of responsibilities would start from a recognition that workers of both sexes have home lives and personal needs that
affect them as workers, and that their lives as workers affect other aspects of
their lives. This would give the employer a certain measure of responsibility to be sensitive to the way in which structures of the workplace can harm
workers' ability to integrate their lives in a socially and personally healthy
way. When we start thinking in a framework of... parenting or caretaking
leave, flexible hours, and flexible locations seem not only possible, but
desirable.78
Within the context of these two features, freedom of choice must be
viewed in an expanded way. It is not enough to give a woman the option
of having a family and keeping her job, for example, by guaranteeing her
right to return to her former employment. The circumstances of her life
condition her freedom to choose. Real freedom of choice must take several factors into account: her ability to afford to stay home until she and
the baby can separate without adverse consequences; her capacity to cope
with work and family responsibilities once she returns to work; the perception of her colleagues and employer that she is making less of a contribution than others because of her home concerns; the perception of her
family that her primary responsibility is at home. In order for the law to
promote real choice for women (and men), Finley advocates moving beyond Littleton's equality of acceptance standard, which would eliminate
the discriminatory consequences of any given choice, to a standard in
77.
78.

Finley, supra note 43, at 1168.
Id. at 1171-72.
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which the gender-specific, social and economic bases for making those
choices are exposed and considered. 9
The standard articulated by Nancy Dowd seems best able to incorporate Finley's expanded definition of equal opportunity in the workplace. Dowd's model not only eliminates the negative consequences of
choices, it measures whether a workrule perpetuates or challenges gender
roles. As Dowd states:
The primary focus of discrimination analysis ... must be whether the affirmative change in work place structure is premised upon, advances, or
reinstitutionalizes gender roles or constructs that reflect patriarchal dominance and power. It must determine whether the restructuring in any way
limits or supports a particular gender role or limitation upon
individual
80
choice by reinforcement of a singular, particular gender role.
To meet Dowd's standard, therefore, an employment policy must offer
choices to employees to deal with a potential conflict of home and work
responsibilities in such a way that stereotyped gender roles are not
reinforced.
I propose to use Dowd's approach to discrimination analysis to formulate a hypothetical standard which can be tested on actual employment policies. This new standard, reformulated from Dowd's, reads as
follows:
Implementation of a new employment policy is unacceptable if it serves to
reinforce gender stereotyping among employees and employers. Reinforcement of these stereotypes includes maintaining a rigid separation between
what is traditionally considered public and private spheres of life, thereby
ignoring the impact on the work environment of societal gender roles
outside the workplace. Furthermore, a new policy which challenges gender
stereotypes is preferred over one which does not.
The remainder of the article will test the capacity of this hypothetical
standard in evaluating employment policies. The standard will be successful if it can be used to examine a particular work policy to determine
the policy's effect in breaking down or reinstitutionalizing gender roles.

IV.

TESTING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE STANDARD

The standard articulated above will be effective as an evaluative tool
only if it can be applied to existing policies. In order to test its potential
efficacy, I have taken several collective bargaining contract clauses and
79. For a further discussion of the distinction between the approaches of Littleton and Finley,
see Dowd, supra note 51, at 162.
80. Id. at 166.
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employer policies which address the confluence of work and family responsibilities in the workplace, and have attempted to evaluate them using the criteria of the standard.8 1 Many examples of contract and
employer policy language were culled from surveys. Both private and
public sector employers were included in the analysis. The workforces
covered by the surveyed policies also varied greatly in size, skill level,
type of work, and degree of unionization. In addition, several complete
contracts were examined in order to understand the context in which
clauses dealing with work and family responsibilities fit into the larger
82
picture of benefits and obligations.

Employer policies and contract clauses dealing with work/family responsibility can be roughly divided into four categories, in ascending order of employer responsibility and involvement: (1) leave time to allow
employees to handle certain family needs outside of work; (2) financial
and other assistance in dealing with family needs; .(3) provision of facili-

ties, either at the job site or elsewhere; and (4) changes in the nature or
structure of the work. No single employer or collective bargaining agreement (CBA) contains all of these options, but the last few years have seen
the emergence of some comprehensive plans which offer a variety of
83
programs.

Leave Time
By far the most common type of benefit is some sort of leave ar81. For collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), my primary 'source is the BNA Study, supra
note 71. The study covers a variety of employment benefits recently negotiated to help workers
balance work and family responsibilities. It provides an analysis of individual contracts with innovative features and summarizes the findings of several surveys which document the existence and use of
such benefits.
The BNA Study is supplemented with my own impressionistic survey of several CBAs representing a wide variety of employees and my experience as a representative of a large public employees
union.
For other employment policies, I relied primarily on a report issued by the International
Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans in 1987. See MARY F. RADFORD, PARENTAL LEAVE: JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE TRENDS:

CURRENT PRACTICES IN THE WORKPLACE (International

Found. of Employee Benefit Plans, Report 87-3, 1987). The report includes a compilation of the
findings of several surveys of parental leave plans offered by a wide range of employers.
82. The CBAs surveyed include: Agreement between AMSCO School Publications, Inc. and
District 65, UAW-AFL-CIO (1987-1990); Agreement between Olin Corp., Niagara Falls Plant and
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, Local 8-77 (1986-1989); Agreement
between the Princeton University Store and District 65, UAW-AFL-CIO (1988-1991); Agreement
between the State of New York and United University Professions, (1988-91) [hereinafter UUP
Agreement] (available at Lockwood Memorial Library, S.U.N.Y. at Buffalo). The other three
CBA's surveyed are available at the Charles B. Sears Law Library, S.U.N.Y. at Buffalo, in a file
entitled "Collective Bargaining Agreements cited in Linda Hassberg, Toward Gender Equality."
83. BNA Study, supra note 71, at 16:721.
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rangement. In CBAs, provision for time off to tend to family problems is
usually found in an article covering leaves of absence or sick/disability
leave. Bona fide reasons for leaves of absence, almost always without
pay, may include varying types of family care, educational and professional opportunities, and time to handle crises. In most cases leaves of
absence are granted at the discretion of the employer.8 4 Sick or disability
leave is usually paid leave, keyed to length of service or a fixed number of
days per year. Sick leave usually can be followed by a paid or unpaid
leave of absence, again at the discretion of the employer. These provisions are always supplemented by legal requirements of employers under
state disability and worker's compensation acts, whether or not the CBA
makes them explicit.8"
When leave time is specifically designated for family care, it is variously labeled family, dependent, parental, maternity, or rarely, paternity
leave. Since federal law forbids discrimination on the basis of pregnancy,8 6 women are able to apply- any general leave provision toward
pregnancy and childbirth. Therefore, virtually every CBA and company
policy affords some limited pregnancy leave, and those which specify maternity leave usually provide some additional benefit. Other types of family leave are not covered by law8 7 and cannot be inferred from a
maternity leave clause.8 8
84. One survey of employer attitudes toward maternity leave found the number of employers
who thought unpaid leave was a reasonable policy much greater than the number who actually
offered it. The surveyors speculated that some employers did not offer leave in writing in order to
preserve their discretion in granting it. RADFORD, supranote 81, at 26. In most policies, leave must
be requested and employers have at least some limited right to refuse it.
85. For example, a California statute makes it unlawful for employers to refuse to allow a pregnant employee leave for the pregnancy, providing such leave does not exceed four months. CAL.
GOV'T. CODE § 12945 (West 1980). Several states have laws mirroring the PDA while others permit
the employer to offer such leave. See RADFORD, supra note 81, at 11-12.
86. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
87. Congress has attempted since 1985 to enact a Family and Medical Leave Act which would
provide a modicum of job protection to employees who must take time off from work for their own
or their family member's illness. The most recent bill, providing twelve weeks of unpaid leave to
workers in firms with 50 or more employees, was vetoed by President Bush in July, 1990. See H.R.
Doc. No. 209, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). The bill has been reintroduced in the 1991 session but
there appears to be little hope of overriding a presidential veto.
88. Since most maternity or pregnancy leave policies are based on disability, they are confined
to women whose pregnancies, pre- and post-partum, physically keep them from working. The constitutionality of preferential treatment toward women in offering them maternity leave while denying
paternity leave to new fathers has not yet been tested. H6wever, one circuit has ruled that when a
contractually provided maternity leave extends beyond the actual physical disability period, it is
unlawfully discriminatory and a violation of Title VII not to permit paternity leave to men covered
by the same contract. Schafer v. Board of Pub. Educ., 903 F.2d 243 (3d Cir. 1990).
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The surveys suggest that the most important distinction among various kinds of maternity leave concerned the continuation of wages and
benefits.8 9 Women covered by temporary disability insurance can usually count on six weeks of paid leave for a normal pregnancy. 90 However, disability coverage is rarely accessible to employees who do not
work for large corporations and it often reimburses only a percentage of
wages. 9 1 While a substantial number of companies allow pregnant employees to use paid sick leave for maternity purposes, the surveys indicate
that time off paid by the employer averages only two to four weeks.9 2
Radford found that "unpaid leave is offered as a supplement to rather
than a substitute for the various forms of paid leave. However ... few
[parents] can afford to take more than a very brief leave unless they and
their families are protected against loss of income."9 "
Paternity leaves are far less common. A 1981 Columbia University
survey of 250 employers found only two firms that offered any type of
paternity benefits. 94 A second survey noted that even though "companies are increasingly offering leaves to new fathers, only nine [of 384]
companies reported that men took advantage of the leave policy." 95 One
surveyor explained this reluctance to take paternity leave as a reaction, at
least in part, to employer bias against men who use the benefit:
Corporations take a far more negative view of unpaid leaves for men than
they do unpaid leaves for women. Almost two-thirds of total respondents
did not consider it reasonable for men to take any parental leave whatsoever.... Even among companies that currently offer unpaid leaves to men,
many thought it unreasonable for men to take them. Fully 41% of companies with unpaid leave policies for men did not sanction their using the
policy.... These results may explain at least in
9 6 part why men are not
taking advantage of the leaves that policies offer.
89. RADFORD, supra note 81, at 20.
90. Id.
91. In 1988, it was estimated that fewer than 40% of working women in small and medium size
firms are covered by disability plans that encompass childbirth and recovery. Jacobson, supra note

65, at 1019 n.7. See also Sheinberg, supra note 65, at 211, 215.
92. RADFORD, supra note 81, at 20. Another study on the incidence of paid and unpaid maternity found that employees with greater tenure are more likely than newer employees to get paid
leave. Trzcinski, supra note 69, at 221.
93. RADFORD, supra note 81, at 21; see also Kamerman, supra note 58, at 16.
94. RADFORD, supra note 81, at 28.
95. Id. at 29 (quoting CATALYST, REPORT ON A NATIONAL STUDY OF PARENTAL LEAVES 38
(1986)).
96. CATALYT, REPORT ON A NATIONAL STUDY OF PARENTAL LEAVES 65-66 (1986), quoted
in RADFORD, supranote 81, at 29-30. For a discussion of the effects of the availability of paternity
leave on men's attitudes towards leave time for infant care, see Marilyn J. Essex & Majorie H.
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The importance of employer attitude is magnified when the prevalence of discretionary leave is added to the picture. Many employers surveyed had no written parental leave policy because they preferred to
retain discretion in granting leave. Since employers are "far more likely
to view parental leave [as] 'reasonable' for mothers than for fathers,"9 7
the proportion of maternity to paternity leaves is even higher, despite the
fact that "male employees seem often to use paid vacation
and/or per'9 8
sonal leaves for time at home after the birth of a child."
All of the surveys found examples of the newer types of leaves.
These included parental or child care leave available to both fathers and
mothers and dependent care leave for employees with elderly or ailing
relatives. The BNA Study found that the existence of new benefits often
"merely formalizes a practice that was being utilized by employees confronted with family illnesses." 99
Of the various types of benefits offered to employees which enable
them to juggle family responsibilities along with work, leave time demands the least effort from the employer. Holding open a temporarily
vacated position may cause problems of scheduling or output, but since
maternity leave can usually be anticipated months in advance, there is
time to make accommodations. The expense and inconvenience of hiring
a temporary replacement means that the overwhelming majority of companies simply re-route the work."° Moreover, the employer's responsibility ends with the granting of the leave. He or she need not concern
him or herself further with the issue. It is incumbent upon the employee
to deal with any conflicts outside of work in the granted time, usually
with the expectation that operations will resume as "normal" once the
employee returns.
An employment policy which grants leaves to women for pregnancy
and childbirth merely equaling the terms offered for other sick and disability leaves would most likely be found inadequate when evaluated by
our proposed standard. Finley's requirement of employer responsibility
in helping employees to integrate their home and work lives is not met.
However, opting for longer, paid maternity leave with a guarantee of
return to the same job without demanding paternity leave under similar
Klein, The Wisconsin Parental Leave Study: The Roles of Fathers, in PARENTAL LEAVE AND CHILD
CARE, supra note 58, at 280.
97. RADFORD, supra note 81, at 26.
98. Id. at 28.
99. BNA Study, supra note 71, at 16:728.
100. BNA HANDBOOK, supra note 57, at 47.
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circumstances might also reinforce gender roles. 101 This perpetuates the
view that mothers, but not fathers, need time at home after the birth of a
child.
Parental or child care leave appears to be a solution less prone to
stereotypical response than maternity leave in that it gives families the
freedom to determine who will care for children and other dependents.
It can be argued that any mention of parental, childcare or dependent
leave, by its very gender neutrality, encourages people to examine their
presumptions that these responsibilities belong solely to women. It may
at least foster the idea that a man should not be penalized by his employer if he needs time to handle a family emergency merely because
women more commonly use the benefit. If the man in the family is the
only one to have a job which remains protected during a leave of absence,
it is likely that he will be even more apt to consider taking the leave to
care for his children.
Even when leave policies are facially gender-neutral, however, their
application and use may further gender-stereotyped behavior. If dependent and child sickness leaves are formally offered but men are informally discouraged from using them, as seems to be the pattern with
paternity leave, women will continue to be designated as the family member who cares for sick family members. If there is no commitment on the
employer's part to disregard use of leave time in deciding on promotions
and work assignments, the leave policy will likewise act to reinforce
traditional gender roles. The availability of leave time without the concomitant employer approval of its use will prevent most men from taking
the benefit since men are more likely than women to view their careers as
their primary role. This runs counter to Littleton's standard that insists
on the elimination of the discriminatory consequences of choice.
Looking at leave time provisions within the context of an entire
CBA can give a better idea of their application. In a CBA covering professional employees,"0 2 unpaid leaves for child care and professional advancement are considered the same benefit.'0 3 On its face, this is a
gender-neutral provision. The likelihood that it is used differently by
men and women, however, means that in fact it does little to reduce
given gender roles. It is a safe assumption that women of child-bearing
age take this leave primarily for maternity and child care purposes while
101. One study found not only that traditional gender roles are enforced but also that this disparity has a negative effect on the couple's relationship. Essex & Klein, supra note 96, at 291.
102. UUP Agreement, supra note 82, at art. 23, pp. 27-33.
103. Id. at 31.
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men of the same age take it for professional development. It can further
be deduced that even unpaid leaves are not granted often, due to the
expense and inconvenience to the establishment, and only very rarely will
the same person be granted leave twice within a short period of time.
Therefore, one can hypothesize that a woman who is rising in a profession and who anticipates pregnancy and childrearing will "save" her
leave time for this purpose, while her male colleague will more typically
use his leave to further his career.
The policy manual governing the same group of professional employees describes the criteria for evaluation and promotion in terms of
professional growth and service to the community. 4 A leave taken for
professional development will most likely aid the employee's evaluation
and promotional opportunities. By the manual's standards, using a family care leave cannot enhance an employee's professional standing and
may even hamper his or her chances for promotion.
On the other hand, the leave provision has to be evaluated within an
historical context. If previously there was no possibility for women to
take an extended maternity leave without jeopardizing their jobs, then
such a provision would improve their chances of staying in their chosen
profession. In addition, because the provision is gender-neutral, a father
who is covered by such a policy has the opportunity to take advantage of
it if his wife has no comparable job flexibility.
An evaluation that takes into account the historical process may
permit maternity leaves without more to be acceptable even under the
hypothetical standard which would not allow the reinforcement of gender roles. The provision of adequate maternity leave as a new benefit,
asserts Finley, "can be a liberating step so long as pressure continues for
adopting policies that would break down the home-work separation for
men, too. Indeed,... once leave for women is accepted, it may be easier
105
to achieve leave for men."
The optimal leave arrangement addressed by the hypothetical standard would allow or perhaps even encourage any worker with a dependent to take time off to care for that dependant as needed without any
negative consequences on the job. This generous benefit could challenge
gender stereotypes through the inference that the home responsibilities
which are valued by the employer are shared by men and women. Many
less than optimal leave provisions would also be acceptable if, taken in a
104.
105.

State University of New York: Policies of the Board of Trustees, art. XII, at 25 (1987).
Finley, supra note 43, at 1175.
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historical context, they do not reinforce traditional gender roles in their
application.
Assistance
Employers or joint labor/management committees which establish
programs to assist families take a further step in recognizing the importance of family responsibilities in people's lives. The BNA Study mentioned previously reported some interesting innovations in this area.
Some large companies offer flexible benefits plans, allowing employees to
choose those benefits best suited to their needs. 106 An option in some of
these plans is financial help for dependent care. 0 7 An employee can
choose to use some of his or her flexible spending account, the yearly
amount allocated to that employee for fringe benefits, in the form of a
child care payment grant. Another option is apportioning some of the
employee's salary into a pretax savings account that the employee can
draw on for dependent care expenses. The BNA Study found flexible
spending accounts for child care expenses to be the most common benefit
offered by employers sponsoring child care benefits.' 08 Similarly, "a
pretax spending account was the type of child care assistance most often
being added in union contracts."" 9 This type of assistance does not
seem to challenge stereotypical gender roles in any way, however.
Labor/management created Employee Assistance Programs (EAPs)
more actively institutionalize recognition that overwhelming family responsibilities can affect an employee's working behavior. An EAP provides confidential referral services to employees with personal difficulties
at no cost. At their inception, EAPs were primarily used for alcohol and
drug treatment and mental health problems but have expanded to include financial assistance and coping with family needs. Within this context, more comprehensive referral services have become available,
sometimes with on-site counselors.
Using EAPs, employers can respond to disciplinary problems and
absenteeism with temporary assistance, counseling, and treatment.
EAPs are usually voluntary, relying on employees to make the initial
contact. However, employers can offer participation in an EAP in a disciplinary context. Under these circumstances, a worker may be given the
106.

These plans are sometime called cafeteria plans. See BNA Study, supra note 71, at 16:727-

28.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 16:721.
109. Id.
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option of using the EAP rather than undergoing discipline or even
discharge.
EAPs have great potential to help individuals find creative solutions
to work and home problems. Employers find them attractive because
resolution of work/family conflicts can lower absenteeism rates and increase productivity. For these reasons, EAPs are gaining in popularity.
Several ingredients must exist in order for an EAP to meet the criteria of broadening the choices available to employees without reinforcing
gender stereotypes as required by the provisional standard set forth
above. EAPs must be equally accessible to all employees, and employers
must be willing to look at problems, especially those which arise with any
regularity, as workplace issues. Thus, EAPs cannot be used as a way to
deflect conflicts created and reinforced by employer inflexibility. Allowing employees the time and space to handle their personal lives is an
important step, but is insufficient if employers continue to view family
responsibilities merely as private problems.
Facilities
Several industries are experimenting with on-site facilities."' This
type of benefit seems most popular with large employers. For example, a
New York state workers' union negotiated a fund to establish a statewide
network of child care centers and a requirement that day care facilities be
provided at every worksite with 500 or more employees."1 In 1989,
more than 2,500 children were enrolled in 38 centers, and lengthy waiting lists were common. Employers who require employees to report at
odd hours, when conventional day care facilities are closed, are also negotiating on-site facilities.'1 2 Some hospitals find 24-hour child care a
successful "perk" in an industry where staff shortages are common." 3
On-site facilities are most often established at corporate headquar110. Such industries include telephone communications, textiles, health care services, electronics; and aircraft assembly as well as many types of public service agencies. See BNA Study, supra
note 71, at 16:721-27.
111. Id. at 16:723.
112. For example, Chrysler's child care facility near its Electronics Division in Huntsville, Alabama is in operation from 5 a.m. to 1 am. to ensure that all its shifts could obtain child care. Id. at
16:725.
113. Id. at 16:724. Jules M. Marquart found that the health care industry provided more onsite facilities than any other industry. She postulates that this is the case because of the industry's
need for "a specialized or highly trained labor force, a shortage of certain types of employees (such
as nurses), or irregular shifts not covered by private child care facilities." Jules M. Marquart, How

Does the Employer Benefit from Child Care?, in PARENTAL
58, at 229.
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ters and government workplaces where the appropriate physical structures already exist. The BNA Study announced a new series of
nationwide agreements between the Communication Workers of
America (CWA), the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
(IBEW) and American Telegraph & Telephone, Inc. (AT&T) which include the "establishment of a jointly administered five million dollar
Family Care Development Fund to support the creation of new facilities
to provide child care and elder care services."'114 In addition, the agreements call for new, more extensive family leave policies including care
for elderly dependents and financial assistance programs for adoption
and day care.11 5
Workplaces with less well-suited physical plants occasionally start
near-site centers, subsidize existing ones in the area for employees or
combine with other firms in the area to service several groups of employees. One example is the City of Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power which negotiated a contract with three unions representing its employees to develop, with the aid of a child care planning and management
service, a comprehensive program.
[The program included] employer-subsidized slots reserved at downtown
child care facilities, as well as referral services for employees seeking community-based care and care for.children with special needs. In addition, the
program included subsidized sick child care services, a pretax dependent
care assistance plan, and regular parenting seminars on childrearing topics.... Male employees were recipients of about 40 percent of the services
provided during the trial period.... Men1 account
for 80 percent of the
16
department's heavily skill-based workforce.
Employment-based facilities and services such as these probably have the
greatest potential for bridging the home/work division of responsibility
that traps women, and individual employees, into making unsatisfactory
choices between two important facets of their lives. The employer makes
a rather substantial, long-term commitment to the issue. The very process of developing and instituting such services insures that much discussion of the problems and possible solutions will occur.
On-site facilities provided at workplaces where employees are
predominantly female may not do a great deal to diminish gender stereotypes. Mothers still bear the responsibility of childcare, but at a more
convenient location. These facilities do fulfill the requirements of the
114. BNA Study, supra note 71, at 16:724.
115. Id. at 16:721.
116. Id. at 16:722.
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standard to the extent that they enable women to combine work and
child care more easily and demonstrate the active involvement of employers. Moreover, when on-site facilities are established at such places
as the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, they encourage the
involvement of male employees who historically have not had to confront
balancing family and job responsibilities. Such facilities can also make it
easier for women to apply and hold non-traditional jobs.
Structural Change
A fourth approach to resolving work/family conflicts is an accommodation in the structure of the work itself. The most easily documented structural change is the increasing malleability of time spent at
work with the availability of flextime and part-time work. Flexible working schedules, or flextime, have been instituted in both office and factory
settings." 7 Employees using flextime are required to work the same
number of hours per week, but they are granted some flexibility within
the work week. In one model, there is a core block of time, for example
between 10:30 a.m. & 2:30 p.m., when all employees must be at work, but
the remaining hours may be scheduled by the individual as desired. In
another model, employees may stretch out a forty-hour work week over
six days or they may compress it into four. Much more common than
formal flextime is the array of informal arrangements made between employer and employees to adjust work schedules to meet the exigencies of
family life. In one survey, 19% of employers formally permit work
schedule adjustments as either a temporary or a permanent arrangement.118 The informal figures are probably much higher.
Another work arrangement that can be evaluated as an option for
juggling work and family responsibilities is part-time work. This is actually a very traditional choice for women who want or need to hold jobs
but who are precluded from working full-time because of their household
duties. Part-time employment opportunities usually offer very limited
benefits and low pay. 19 Part-time work is still considered innovative in
many industries which have not traditionally employed women. 12 0
117. For a report on the use of flextime and flexible leave time in banks, see Joseph P. Ritz,
Goldome a Leader in Flexible Work Rules, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 24, 1991, at Bll, B19.
118. BNA Study, supra, note 71, at 16:730; Mitzi Dunn, Employers' Child Care Policies: Sick
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Both flextime and part-time options give greater freedom to some
workers to manage their dual home and career roles. Single parents and
working couples are able to arrange their schedules to accommodate
other demands on their time such as doctor appointments, babysitters
and school hours. It enables some employees to spend more time with
their families without giving up needed earnings or work satisfaction.
On the other hand, it is questionable to what degree part-time work has
expanded employment opportunities for women with families, encouraged more employer responsibility on the issue, or challenged gender
role stereotypes. Inherent in the entire discussion of employment options which may give women and their families more freedom to make
real choices about the direction of their lives is the expansion in the
choice of type of employment, not merely the opportunity to work. The
pernicious prevalence of sex-based discrimination in employment in the
form of occupational segregation12 1 lies beyond the scope of this article.
Suffice it to say that if an option such as part-time work is only available
in a very limited number of occupations and industries, its appeal as a
method of accommodating the needs of working women with families is
sharply limited.
In a study of occupational segregation, researchers Karen Holden
and Lee Hansen found the phenomenon even more prevalent among
part-time employees than among those who work full-time. 122 They
noted that
[flemale part-time job holders of all ages experience far higher occupational
segregation than do full-time job holders. While female part-time job holders may face more severe labor market constraints in job choice than women willing to work full time, it is clear that the sex of these part[-]time
workers is as important in determining their employment as it is for other
workers. Even part-time jobs may be allocated to men and women differently; the decision to work part-time is not sufficient to explain the measured occupational segregation for the total work force since this decision
may in fact subject workers to even greater than average discrimination on
account of sex. 123
In other words, women who desire to work part-time have very little
choice about the kind of work they will be hired to do. Traditional fullagencies are increasingly making part-time work available in order to retain highly skilled, experienced employees. See, e.g., King, supra note 75, at 986.
121. See, ag., WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK: SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB (Barbara F.

Reskin & Heidi I. Hartmann eds., 1986).
122. Holden & Hansen, supra note 119, at 236-37.
123. Id. at 231.
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time "women's work" tends to be underpaid and undervalued; part-time
work in these fields, with its lack of benefits, limited opportunities for
promotion, and weaker job security, appears even less attractive.
The severity of these problems led Holden and Hansen to caution
against the growing use of part-time workers by employers, despite the
positive attributes of a part-time schedule:
Part-time opportunities greatly expand the work options of women who are
unable or unwilling to work full time and simultaneously meet their household and child-rearing obligations. At the same time, because many parttime jobs are in occupations dominated by women, part-time employment
may reinforce women's traditional work roles
124and also offset their employment gains in male-dominated occupations.
Thus, the creation of part-time opportunities would not meet the criteria
of the hypothetical standard if the jobs were made available only in traditional women's occupations, especially if those jobs offered no possibility
for promotion. This would reinforce gender stereotyping with the assumption that women must choose between devotion to family and career advancement. A more acceptable arrangement would be the
integration of part-time workers into the mainstream of the organization
or industry, at jobs that would be attractive to both men and women.
Other changes in the nature or structure of work are much more
difficult to identify. In some professional fields, there have been experiments in redesigning the workload to reduce stress on employees during
the years when family responsibilities are the greatest. 125 Experiments in
homework and various types of self-employment, the creation of different
tracks or career paths and efforts to incorporate the entire family into the
work itself exist too infrequently, informally and individually to evaluate
here. These changes should be noted, however, because they do point to
the directions in which the work setting may be changed to help break
down the division between home and work life.
CONCLUSION

As more women enter and remain in the workforce, exciting new
opportunities are developing for our equal participation in all facets of
worklife. At the same time, the primary responsibility for family and
home care still rests with women, creating constraints on the choices
available for both adequate family care and proper attention and coin124. Id. at 217.
125. For example, an increasing number of District Attorneys' offices are offering part-time
work schedules for their attorneys. See King, supra note 75, at 986.
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mitment to work. While laws prohibiting sex discrimination have increased access to employment and education, they have not dealt with
the concomitant problems of continuing equality of opportunity between
men and women in the face of women's added burdens.
Feminist legal scholars have criticized the inadequacy of the discrimination analysis used by the courts to measure the legitimacy of differential treatment. The new standards they propose differ in significant
ways, but all attempt to move away from reinforcing stereotyped gender
roles and give greater value to diversity of abilities and needs. The formulation of a feminist discrimination standard is still in the theoretical
.stage. While scholars have envisioned the effects of its application in a
work setting, they have not yet addressed its implementation beyond
rather vague, unsatisfactory suggestions that courts may be persuaded to
adopt it. Yet these feminist scholars have a rich laboratory available for
testing a new standard of equality in the wide range of experiments being
tried in a variety of workplaces. The work world has the potential for
much more rapid adaptation to the kind of societal changes brought
about by women who enter the workforce than do the courts or the legislatures. It is in employers' interests to help their employees balance work
and outside demands in order to keep them as trained, productive members of the workforce. The experimental policies used in adapting to
these new challenges should be evaluated by the new standards legal
scholars are suggesting. Employer policies will be successful if they have
the ability to increase options for women by breaking down the division
between home and work life that perpetuates corifining societal gender
roles. Understanding the effectiveness of such a standard in determining
its impact on gender stereotyping will in turn help scholars craft a functional model.
A truly workable standard will not have to await adoption by the
courts. The analysis attempted in this paper can be useful to employers,
union and other employee advocates who are searching for effective new
policies. A set of criteria can be developed to examine existing contract
language and employment plans for gender neutrality, diversity and flexibility of options. In formulating a new policy, evaluation of the consequences of its use and application to job security, assignments,
promotions, and employer attitudes should be incorporated. As demonstrated by this article, one measurement of a new policy should be
whether its implementation would encourage workers and employers to
re-evaluate traditional gender role assumptions or, conversely, reinforce
traditional views that tend to limit gender roles.
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A standard of equality which values diversity rather than measuring difference should emphasize employment policies that encourage new
thinking about the integration of home and work lives for all employees.
Benefits such as flexible leave time, on-the-job assistance for family
problems, and varied scheduling to accommodate family needs encourage both employers and employees to discuss conflicts of work and
family responsibility and reexamine attitudes about responsibility and
role. Through successful experimentation, the groundwork will be laid
for more widespread pressure to accommodate the needs of all employees
through legislation.

